Post-cure by Warren, Narelle & Addison, Courtney
  
  
 
 
Medicine Anthropology Theory 7 (2): 93–108; https://doi.org/10.17157/mat.7.2.691. 
© Narelle Warren and Courtney Addison, 2020. Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
license. 
 
 
 
 
 
POSITION PIECES 
Post-cure 
Narelle Warren and Courtney Addison 
Abstract  
The curative imaginary is a powerful driver of hope and investment in medicine, often 
displacing attention and resources given to other illness-related fields of practice. Whereas cure 
implies an end to the sick role and the possibility of an absolute state of health, in practice 
those fields that are touted as having high curative potential grapple with the ongoing nature 
and incompleteness of post-cure care. By capturing the public imagination and channelling 
research and funding in particular directions, the motif of cure risks drawing resources away 
from other, less seductive forms of treatment, and towards the technological at the expense 
of the social. Drawing on our research into precision medicine and deep brain stimulation, we 
track how cure operates as a concept in these fields, and compare this to how medical 
practitioners actually care for patients. We argue that a critical engagement with post-cure 
possibilities offers an opportunity to challenge and rethink what constitutes good medical care, 
as well as the social, political, and economic underpinnings of medical innovation. 
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Introduction 
The idea of medical cures for serious diseases is more frequently invoked in rhetoric than 
delivered in practice. ‘Cure’ is an organising motif in biomedicine, generating interest, support, 
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and investment in medical research. It brings with it the potential to alleviate or remove 
suffering, both in the present and extending into the future, and to extend the possibility of a 
well-lived life. Since the mid-1980s,1 for example, the field of gene therapy sought to locate a 
cure for genetic diseases. Early proponents argued that gene therapy was uniquely positioned 
to cure disease at the level of DNA. This ‘promise’ drove cycles of intense investment – and 
subsequent disappointments – from the first clinical trial of a gene therapy technology, which 
was used to successfully treat two children with genetic conditions, in 1990 (Addison 2017). 
This Position Piece advocates for a post-cure analysis of biomedical technologies. In so doing, 
we call for an anthropology that not only looks at what happens to a person’s life after they 
receive a cure (as Heinemann 2016 evocatively demonstrates in the case of organ transplant), 
but which extends our – as publics, anthropologists, and scholars, and as potential future 
recipients of such technologies – gaze beyond cure. By ‘beyond cure’, we do not advocate for a 
dismissal of cure; rather, we argue for a more nuanced consideration of its value (personal, 
social, and economic) to individuals and communities than is currently found in most 
discussions. In so doing, we highlight the ongoing need to recognise the value of informal care 
– that is, the intersubjective and relational activities that develop between people who are 
invested in the process of living with illness, as well as those practical actions that one person 
undertakes on behalf of or for another (see Warren and Sakellariou 2020).  
Over the past four decades and in response to rapid technological developments in the 
treatment of illness and disease, cure has become an imaginary that directs resources in 
particular ways (i.e., towards medical/pharmaceutical research and, thus, the creation of new 
markets, as detailed by DelVecchio Good [2001] in her work on the medical imaginary and 
the biotechnical embrace), but which do not necessarily benefit patients and their close others. 
Philosopher of science Jacob Stegenga (2018) contends that biomedicine has in fact achieved 
very few cures. Yet, the mythology of the curative power of biomedicine persists, and, as 
Scheufele et al. (2017) showed in a recent survey of US attitudes towards gene editing, publics 
express high levels of confidence in the notion of biomedical cure (Petersen 2015).  
In this Position Piece, we question what would happen if publics, broadly conceived, shifted 
resources and attention away from an almost exclusive focus on cure to a more inclusive 
approach that also considers care. We argue that medicine’s overemphasis on cure jeopardises 
other forms of care, while undermining other perspectives on health and medicine – including 
 
1  Although gene therapy technologies have been reported as being in development since the early 
1970s, we refer to this date, sourced from the US National Institutes of Health online exhibit 
entitled ‘Human Genetics and Medical Research: A revolution in progress’ (n.d.), as this is when 
tissue culture trials commenced. This exhibit can be accessed at: 
https://history.nih.gov/exhibits/genetics/sect4.htm. 
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those of anthropologists. To show this, we trace how cure operates across two medical fields; 
first examining how ideas of cure manifest in medical discourse and then comparing these to 
the care that patients actually receive.2 The first field we examine is precision medicine, which 
we treat here as the field of medical research and practice concerned with developing 
molecular-scale diagnostics and therapeutics. The second is the highly aspirational field of 
neurodegenerative cure, which is based in ongoing and unresolved controversies about the 
origins of dementias including Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, and motor neuron 
disease (Lansbury and Lashuel 2006; Obeso et al. 2010; Turner et al. 2013; Morris, Clark, and 
Vissel 2014).  
Cure in these contexts is a dual process of problem identification and solution: diagnosis 
(problem identification) occurs through treatment (solution) (Warren and Manderson 2015). 
While these medical fields differ in many respects, taken together they represent the dominant 
medical discourse that has occupied biomedical and popular imaginaries in recent decades, 
and illustrate how the figure of cure holds its shape across contexts and time. Examining these 
two domains, we argue that cure operates as an ideal, unmoored from the specifics of place, 
time, and body – and, in consequence, is general and generalisable. That is, cure is not only an 
outcome of treatment for particular illness conditions (for example, the goal of cancer 
treatment is five year survival, which represents a ‘cure’ [NIH National Cancer Institute 2018]), 
but has also become an overarching aim of technological developments in biomedicine (for 
example, as evident in the call for a ‘cure for cancer’).3 Yet, it is the specifics of people’s 
experiences that make spaces for care essential: even in the journey towards successful 
treatment or cure, ill people require care – from healthcare providers, from formal services, 
and from informal caregivers. Presenting interview and observational data from patients, we 
demonstrate that the claims about technological outcomes – cures – made on behalf of 
experimental medicine contradict clinical realities; this can be seen, for example, in claims that 
the bionic eye (visual prosthesis) will restore sufficient clarity of vision to distinguish facial 
features, whereas current prostheses only offer a highly pixelated greyscale differentiation of 
light (see figure 4 in Maghami et al. 2014). Finally, we consider how the biomedical ideology 
 
2  We frame ‘cure’ in the singular to foreground that our interest is in the idea or motif of cure 
(e.g., the cure for cancer), and to distinguish this from more diverse individual cures (e.g., 
targeted cancer therapies, such as trastuzumab for HER2 receptor positive breast and stomach 
cancers [Nahta, Hung and Esteva 2004]). 
3  The call for ‘a’ cure for cancer is significant, as it obscures the multiplicity of conditions that are 
often collapsed into the singular term ‘cancer’.  
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of cure has real implications for patients and those who love and support them, devaluing 
their experiences and side-lining the importance of care in biomedical encounters. 
* * * 
Medicine is organised in response to bodily events or states of being that are seen to be in 
need of correction – the pathological. Georges Canguilhem ([1943] 2012) saw the aim of 
medicine as returning patients to the state of health that preceded their sickness;4 he highlights 
the irony of this project, which, if successful, negates its own necessity and thus resembles a 
long exercise in obsolescence. Building on these observations, Matthew Wolf-Meyer (2014, 
145) argues that this project ‘is thwarted by the inability to return individuals to their actual 
prior state, instead only approximating the patient’s prepathological condition’. In practice, 
medicine cannot effect a return to past health or a restitution of the body; it moves only 
forward, in time and matter. As Lenore Manderson (2011) demonstrates, the idea of a return 
to the previously well body does not account for the perpetual contingency of health, nor the 
many aspects of illness that exceed biology (e.g., its impacts on identity, relationships, 
orientation towards the future, etc.). The notion of cure is laden with assumptions about the 
temporality of sickness and integrity of the body that reinforce precisely these often 
unachievable ideas of return and restitution, bodily wholeness, and the potential for absolute 
health (cf. Manderson 2011).  
Hitched to biomedical disease models and market dynamics, the idea of cure crowds out other 
possibilities of care – even when the cure itself does not exist (Chaufan et al. 2012). The 
‘triumph of cure over care’ (ibid., 792) is revealed in the material value assigned to the labour 
of caregiving as compared to that of medicine. In 2017, the mean wage of ‘care workers and 
home carers’ in the UK was £13,948, and that of ‘senior care workers’ was £17,394; ‘medical 
professionals’, by comparison, enjoyed a mean annual wage of £71,203, and ‘biological 
scientists and biochemists’ earned an average of £38,647 (ONS 2017).  
Bharat Venkat’s (2016) history of tuberculosis (TB) treatment offers another example of cure 
overwhelming care. His Madras study demonstrating the efficacy of combined antibiotics for 
TB became the grounds for arguing that, if properly administered, antibiotics eliminated the 
need for admission to a sanatorium or hospital, which had previously been considered essential 
to managing the disease. Subsequent evidence showed that women who received their 
 
4  Similarly, Talcott Parsons (1951) provides a sociological analysis of the return to health in his 
seminal work The Sick Role. 
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antibiotics at home relapsed more frequently than men or women in sanatoria – a finding that 
suggests a cure is only as good as its context. 
Recent work from science and technology studies (STS) with people living with hepatitis C 
has again showed this privileging of cure over care by public health bodies (including 
governments) and health providers (Madden et al. 2018). For people who have lived with 
hepatitis C, the relationship between cure and care is nuanced: while participants in Madden’s 
study valued successful treatment (i.e., cure), they prioritised other (non-cure-related) 
outcomes, including wellness, social relationships, preserving their sense of identity, and 
feeling capable of managing their future health. Here, a focus on cure that excludes the social 
dimensions of illness – elements that comprise care – misses key aspects of individuals’ illness 
experiences and potentially undermines the curative project.  
As these examples show, medical cure, despite appearances, may not be a panacea. Cure, like 
biomedicine more broadly, is deeply normative: it implicitly positions medicine as the only 
acceptable form of resolving sickness. Once available, cures direct patients down specific 
avenues of action and resolution, and make these morally imperative. As Wolf-Meyer (2014) 
suggests, cure refigures relationships between individuals, treatments, and their condition, and 
by extension, between patients, the market, and the healthcare profession. The 
patient/consumer is obliged to find and embrace (re)solutions to their pathology, and the 
existence of a cure (however impermanent or incomplete) hitches the pathology to market 
medicine. Furthermore, the absence of cure generates its own normative force, driving potential 
future imaginaries and reframing biomedical priorities, as in precision medicine. 
Precision medicine: Promise and peril 
With its rhetoric of cure and the widespread support this has generated, precision medicine is 
an archetype of promissory biosciences. Encompassing gene and cell therapies plus 
increasingly fine-resolution diagnostics, precision medicine has gained backing around the 
world. The USA launched a Precision Medicine Initiative in 2015, while the UK recently 
routinised the use of genetic testing for cancer patients. In 2018, Australia committed to 
investing A$500 million in genomics research, following the launch of a report on the national 
prospects of precision medicine.5 
 
5  A useful overview of these national precision and personalised medicine projects can be found 
in an Australian Council of Learned Academies report by Robert Williamson et al. (2018). 
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These initiatives reinforce claims about the imminent breakthroughs that precision medicine 
will realise. Social scientists argue that such ‘promissory’ rhetoric typifies the biosciences, and 
genomics specifically. Cure discourse is fundamentally performative, realising its own claims 
about the value of specific medical pursuits through strategic ‘hype’ (Petersen and Krisjansen 
2015). The dominant motif of cure is reproduced through a ‘genetic knowledge economy’, 
new modes of interaction and new markets which draw upon genetic knowledge (as can be 
seen in the marketisation of genetic information and knowledge via companies such as 
23andme). Steve Sturdy (2017) argues that this has the effect of rendering the public benefit 
of genomic medicine inseparable from the commercial forces that underlie it. Developments 
in precision medicine thus produce expectations about the possibilities of cure – each new 
development is lauded as transforming the practice of medicine – and simultaneously redefine 
how health and illness are conceptualised (Petersen 2006).  
This rhetoric’s efficacy hinges on the status of cure as potential rather than actual. Karen-Sue 
Taussig, Klauss Hoeyer, and Stefen Helmreich (2013, S4) write that in biomedicine, 
potentiality is articulated ‘as a hopeful idiom through which to imagine the benefits of new 
medical interventions’. As the potential end point of medical research, cure transcends the 
imperfections and compromises of actual medicine, and is imagined to exist in an ideal state 
of total efficacy (cf. Stegenga 2018). This capacity to inspire hope is what lends cure its power, 
as realised in clinical trials enrolment, investment, research activity, and the machinations of 
medical research more widely. Cure may thus be the most powerful fiction of promissory 
discourse – an abstract idea presented to patients, investors, and medical practitioners as if it 
were a material actuality that could be realised if enough resources were available, rather than 
as a potential outcome which could only be accessed if future technoscientific developments 
occurred (Stegenga 2018). Indeed, central to biomedical potentiality is the possibility that the 
sought-after outcome may never exist (Tausig, Hoeyer, and Helmreich 2013); it is a collective 
faith (or, as Stegenga 2018 argues, misplaced confidence) in the odds presented by biomedical 
imaginaries that perpetuates the myth of cure.  
In practice, cure operates differently in different contexts. A productive fiction at the level of 
medical fields, the notion of cure is often actively evaded in clinical settings. In interviews, 
medical practitioners employ language that captures more precisely measurable improvements 
in patients’ health and demonstrable research successes rather than relying on an idiom of 
‘cure’. 
Medicine Anthropology Theory 
 
 
 
 
99 
Insights from interviews with Alex,6 a primary school-aged boy, illustrate this point. In the 
months prior to our interview, Alex received a form of genetic medicine to treat a rare and 
life-threatening immunological condition that meant he lived without a functioning immune 
system. The treatment improved Alex’s health and wellbeing on several counts: his skin was 
less prone to rashes and he had fewer bloody noses. These apparently minor outcomes indexed 
more significant improvements in his immune function and platelet counts. In real-life terms, 
they made for a much-improved childhood, which Alex embraced by participating eagerly in 
school and social life. What had previously been a debilitating and life-shortening disease was 
now, by his doctor’s interpretation, a ‘very mild’ variant of that original condition.  
The changes Alex experienced transformed his life expectancy and wellbeing to a degree that 
would have been unthinkable prior to the advent of genetic medicine. However, cure implies 
an end to the ‘sick role’, such that the cured patient resumes their pre-sickness state of health 
(Parsons 1951). Alex will continue to participate in the monitoring and treatment regimes of 
the medical world. His experience complicates the notion of cure in another way: because he 
was born with this condition, there is no prior state of health for Alex to return to. The implicit 
division between well and ill becomes impossible to entertain.  
In one respect, Alex is a beneficiary of cure rhetoric. One could argue that the hype cycles that 
shadowed early genetic medicine supported research in this area, and then, after the field 
crashed at the turn of the millennium, only the best researchers and projects persisted. Alex’s 
treatment is an outcome of these processes. Yet the concept of cure seems meaningless, if not 
obfuscating, in relation to his own health changes – indeed, his medical team tend not to talk 
about cures at all, pointing instead to more modest and measurable outcomes such as 
neutrophil levels and clinical symptoms (e.g., nose bleeds). Cure (as motif) works very 
differently in patients’ lives and in actual medical practice on the one hand, and at the level of 
public discourse and the bioeconomy on the other.  
The escape from disease labels and the lived experience of sickness that cure implies is 
misleading. Cure itself does not remove an individual from ecologies of biomedicine. In fact, 
it creates new modes of engagement by shifting former patients’ relationships to risk and 
susceptibility. Alex no longer ‘has’ (that is, lives under the diagnosis of [Martin 2007]) his 
previous, life-threatening immunological condition. Nonetheless, that legacy is documented in 
 
6  ‘Alex’ is a pseudonym, as are all patient names provided in this piece. Because Alex’s disease is 
extremely rare and risks de-identifying him, I (Addison) cannot reveal the specific disease nor 
his site of treatment. I met Alex at a European hospital in 2015, during six months of fieldwork 
that formed part of my doctoral research.  
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his medical records and never disappears from his biography, creating a ‘risk profile’ and 
necessitating further care (albeit different to his initial care). Comparing the complicated reality 
of Alex’s care to the rhetoric of precision medicine suggests that, rather than remove this 
illness from his future, his cure instead re-inscribes his illness as ‘risk’ and gives rise to new 
engagements with biomedicine. In discourse, precision medicine straddles a blurry zone 
between what is actually possible and what remains only potential, allowing the notion of cure 
to generate resources and activity that then feed into the more precise and modest goals of 
actual patients’ actual care. 
Neuroscientific potentialities of cure  
Seductive futures, such as those offered by precision medicine, can also be found in the 
neurosciences, where they inform the development of neurological interventions and 
technologies. These ‘neuro-curative imaginaries’ capitalise on neuroscientific and biomedical 
understandings of disease causation to generate new spaces where ideas of cure can be 
examined, promoted, or challenged (cf. Rhodes et al. 2019). Ultimately, these neuro-curative 
imaginaries act to displace care by a focus on cure in scientific and public discourse (discussed 
further below). Our own work (Gardner et al. 2019) analysing amateur YouTube videos of 
deep brain stimulation (DBS) for Parkinson’s disease (PD) exemplified this: patients filmed 
their symptoms disappearing as their devices were turned on, underscoring the technology’s 
curative potential. At the same time, the social context was removed: few other people were 
featured in the videos and material environments were often obscured. Here, the image of 
cure papered over the social compromises and reciprocities involved in Parkinson’s care 
(Gardner et al. 2019; Warren and Sakellariou 2020).  
Neuro-curative imaginaries are most visible in the allocation of funding around 
neurodegenerative disease. In such contexts, cure stands in contrast to the ‘living with’ 
chronicity that characterises other long-term conditions (Manderson and Smith-Morris 2010). 
Since 2014, in Australia, ‘The Big Freeze’ fundraising and awareness-raising campaign for 
research on motor neuron disease (MND, also termed amyotrophic lateral sclerosis [ALS]) 
have been phenomenally successful, generating over A$22 million in 2017/2018. Of this, just 
A$1.25 million (or around 5 percent) was directed at care initiatives, with the remainder 
funding curative research.7 The aetiology of MND is unclear in the vast majority of cases 
(Mehta et al. 2018), and development of a cure is not possible without understanding causation 
(Collins-Praino and Katharesan 2017). The distribution of funding to curative pursuits 
 
7  Figures taken from the Fight MND website (https://fightmnd.org.au/cure/; 
https://fightmnd.org.au/care/) 
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illustrates the powerful promissory rhetoric of techno-solutionism (Gardner and Warren 
2019). This rhetoric contains a sense of futurity, which imagines, via the deployment of novel 
technologies, a transformed self and body free of the challenges of illness. Potentiality 
(Taussig, Hoeyer, and Helmreich 2013) is evident here in both future orientation and 
transformative potential. The concept of cure is productive in the context of 
neurodegenerative conditions precisely because of existing limits of medical treatment and 
management (Warren and Manderson 2015), as we consider in the example of DBS below.  
Parkinson’s disease and DBS 
PD is an idiopathic neurodegenerative condition commonly associated with tremor and 
rigidity (for an overview, see Warren and Manderson 2015). While some people have 
significant degeneration over a relatively short period, others experience a prolonged disease 
course. As the condition progresses, it becomes increasingly hard for people living under a 
diagnosis of PD – whether as the person so diagnosed or as caregiver – to manage; dopamine-
replacement (or agonist) medications may steadily reduce in effectiveness (Olanow, Obeso, 
and Stocchi 2006). Some patients who experience reduced efficacy of standard medications 
may seek, or be offered, treatment with DBS. While DBS was originally offered to people 
some years into their lives with PD, it is increasingly offered to people early in their illness 
course (Hacker et al. 2018). A relatively new, high-cost, high-efficacy therapy, DBS involves 
the implantation of fine wires deep into the basal ganglia region of the brain, where they deliver 
constant electrical stimulation through a cardiac pacemaker-like device (Gardner and Warren 
2019; Okun 2014). While the wires remain inserted on a permanent basis, patients can turn 
the device on and off, and neurosurgeons can adjust stimulation levels. 
The promotion of DBS as a ‘cure’ for PD illustrates how transformative potential is attributed 
to novel technologies. For the YouTube video makers described above (Gardner et al. 2019), 
DBS brings forth the promise of a changed body and thus a reduced need for informal and 
formal care, greater autonomy, and a restitution of sorts, where PD is paused so long as the 
device is on. However, DBS, as a technological cure for PD, raises deeper questions about the 
socioeconomic realities of illness and healthcare, particularly around questions of equity and 
access.  
Despite a well-funded universal healthcare system, Parkinson’s treatments are not available 
equally to all patients in Australia. Indeed, patterns in treatment provision – particularly for 
DBS – reveal the social fault lines (Heckert 2018; Hammad Mrig, this issue) of 
neurodegeneration. While DBS is routinely offered as a cost-effective, long-term solution that 
responds to both disease progression and reducing effectiveness of medication, it is only 
realistically available to those who have private health insurance and funds to cover the 
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significant out-of-pocket costs (A$10,000-$25,000+). For most people with PD, this is out of 
reach, especially on top of other PD management costs (e.g., medication, specialist 
appointments, and adjunct therapies). In this way, cure brings structural inequalities to bear – 
it is not accessible to all. This raises a fundamental question for health economics and 
healthcare policy: how many resources should be allocated to finding ‘new’ cures while existing 
cures remain out of reach for the majority of the population? Such questions of equity present 
challenges to how states provide care: here, unlike in the interpersonal care defined earlier, 
discussions of care (as an obligation of a state towards its citizens) are inseparable from 
considerations of cure and access to cure. 
The economic unevenness of DBS access echoes broader social trends in Parkinson’s 
treatment and advocacy, thus informing agenda setting around the disease. In Narelle Warren’s 
ethnographic research with Australians living with PD and their caregivers (see Warren and 
Ayton 2018; Warren and Sakellariou 2020), wealthier people (that is, self-funded retirees) 
participated more in Parkinson’s-related activities and organisations – for example, taking up 
roles on boards of management and planning local fundraising activities – than those who 
relied on state-based welfare (e.g., old age or disability pensions). Accordingly, their personal 
priorities informed the strategic directions of key support organisations. This was further 
complicated by a shifting funding context, including government funding, which encouraged 
NGOs’ greater engagement with biomedicine. Influential for Warren’s ethnographic research 
was how global neurodegeneration fundraising events dramatically shifted what research was 
supported and by whom: at the start of her project, in 2011, relevant NGOs repeatedly 
reiterated their commitment to the provision of support and care to those living with PD. 
However, following the widespread success of the 2014 Ice Bucket Challenge for MND in 
raising significant monies to ‘search for cure’, with amounts raised matched by the Federal 
Government, the NGOs not only altered their fundraising strategy but, importantly, shifted 
their focus to almost exclusively supporting research concerned with cure.  
While such a shift ostensibly benefits everyone with PD, poorer people in her study felt 
silenced in representations of PD and in advocacy efforts. They were also less likely to have 
access to programmes for ongoing support or more effective treatments, compounding social 
isolation and worsening health status (Manderson and Warren 2016): for these participants, 
DBS offered much, but its promises were impossible to attain. Those who cannot afford 
‘curative’ technologies thus face a new moral dilemma, introduced and subsequently 
reinforced by the cure motif. There is a moral imperative to want a cure if it is available, or if 
it might become so; yet cure is not accessible for poorer patients. A post-cure analytic – which 
encourages an interrogation of, rather than broad acceptance of, curative technologies – is 
thus required to understand what the cure motif does.  
Medicine Anthropology Theory 
 
 
 
 
103 
Post-cure engagements do more than highlight social fault lines. Our analysis of amateur 
YouTube videos of DBS (Gardner et al. 2019) reveals the socialities – positioning of the self 
and others within social environments – of PD. An exclusive focus on cure not only strips out 
others or environments (as described above), but also transforms personhood. YouTube 
video-makers focused on functional outcomes, largely motor function: their bodies were the 
material through which cure was effective, but the sense of who they were as people was (for 
the most part) absent. Yet, in Warren’s interviews, concerns about personhood played a central 
role in the considerations of cure they reported. Participants described their need to weigh the 
potential outcomes of DBS against the social, emotional, and economic costs of the treatment. 
Pam, for example, explained that she felt the ‘trade-offs’ of DBS were too costly, and so the 
therapy was not appealing: 
I’m not keen on it… I belong to [a] group and every one of those women has had the 
operation, except for me, and from what I have observed, every one of them, the 
reasons why they had the operation was great. I mean, not great, but was 
understandable. But every single one of them has had to have a trade-off… [those] 
trade-offs have been worse than the original symptoms in my way of thinking. Like, 
for instance, Sharon, her main love besides her family was dancing and reading, and 
she had the deep brain stimulation and her trade-off was that she um, could no longer 
dance and she could no longer read... For me, not being able to dance, or… to read… 
would be [unacceptable].  
Pam’s discussion of the transformation of personhood following DBS highlighted the tension 
between cure and care. She believed the psychosocial changes of the treatment raised far more 
concerns than the motor symptoms of the disease ever did. On the one hand, she emphasized 
the limits of techno-solutionism: ‘every single one of them has had to have a trade-off’. 
Simultaneously, she acknowledged the attractiveness of cure (i.e., where she stated ‘the reasons 
why they had the operation was great’).  
Pam’s quote demonstrated the differential impacts of DBS. For example, Sharon’s tremor 
resolved after the DBS surgery and thus she had a good outcome in this aspect; however, 
losing her ability to dance and read represents a poor outcome. This highlights how some 
potentialities of technology are realised, while others are undermined. Pam understood this in 
terms of ‘trade-offs’.  
Notions of personhood, and its transformation in response to neurodegeneration, provide at 
least a partial explanation of why cure is so compelling: the association between physical neural 
structures, mental concepts of mind, and social concepts of personhood are all troubled 
following a diagnosis of neurodegenerative disease. Dominant understandings conflate these 
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different elements, making them seem inextricable. As Nina Strohminger and Shaun Nichols 
(2015) demonstrate, cognitive impairment is commonly associated with a lost or changed 
identity. For people living with neurodegenerative conditions, and their close others, curative 
technologies seem to offer a way to reclaim the lost self, or the self in process of becoming 
lost. 
Conclusions 
Cure is central to social imaginaries of sickness, dominating discourse and research agendas. 
We have argued that prioritising cure over care can misdirect our expectations of science, 
medicine, and doctors. This dynamic has implications for patients and their families, whose 
hopes may be pinned on vanishingly small statistical odds, and whose preferences and voices 
are devalued or subsumed by curative hype (Stegenga 2018).  
Further, as we have demonstrated in this Position Piece, the idea of cure influences not only 
individual patients but also the economic dynamics of experimental medical science. In the 
latter domain, to focus on cure to the exclusion of other concerns is to commit a form of 
structural violence, as only people with sufficient social, political, or economic resources will 
be able to realise the promises associated with cure. In this way, cure is an ideology that shifts 
resources unequally amongst those living with illness (Stegenga 2018). It sets all sights on an 
outcome that is unlikely to be achieved, an impossible possibility, and where it is realisable, 
will not be realised by all without significant commitment by the state. 
In this Position Piece, we initiate a post-cure analysis of biomedical technologies: cure has 
implications that extend beyond the illness and, sometimes, beyond the person. These must 
be interrogated. As we have demonstrated, cure shifts temporalities of life and of illness, 
prompts new engagements with risk, generates new socialities and materialities, reveals 
questions of equity and access, and transforms personhood. For those who live under a 
diagnosis that offers no hope of restitution, curative technologies are not the only source of 
hope, although cures are often positioned as the only way for patients to conceive a potential 
future or a future with potential. Life with illness, regardless of prognosis, has meaning beyond 
engagement with technology. A post-care analytic illuminates the complexity of life under 
diagnosis, and recognises the role of care – within and between individuals – in constructing 
lives worth living. 
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